Childcare subsidies and labour supply — Evidence from a large Dutch reform by Bettendorf, L.H.J. et al.
Childcare subsidies and labour supply -
Evidence from a large Dutch reform
Leon J.H. Bettendorf∗ Egbert L.W. Jongen† Paul Muller‡
March 2015
Abstract
After the introduction of the Law on Childcare in 2005, childcare subsidies in the
Netherlands became much more generous. Public spending on childcare increased
from 1 to 3 billion euro over the period 2004–2009. Using a differences-in-differences
strategy we find that, despite the substantial budgetary outlay, this reform had only
a modest impact on employment. Furthermore, the rather small effects we find are
likely confounded by a coincident increase in the EITC for parents with young chil-
dren of 0.6 billion euro, which presumably also served to increase the labour supply
of the group. The joint reform increased the maternal employment rate by 2.3 per-
centage points (3.0%) and maternal hours worked by 1.1 hours per week (6.2%).
The results further suggest that the reform slightly reduced hours worked by fathers.
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1 Introduction
Many countries seek to increase the labour force participation of mothers with young
children. Policymakers often point to Scandinavia, where public spending on childcare is
high and participation rates of mothers are high as well. Indeed, several countries and
regions have adopted part of the Scandinavian model by providing generous childcare
subsidies to parents with young children (e.g. the Netherlands, Quebec) or are in the
process of doing so (e.g. Germany).
In this paper we study the causal effect of childcare subsidies on labour supply by
means of a large, recent reform in the Netherlands. After the introduction of the Law on
Childcare in 2005, childcare subsidies in the Netherlands became much more generous.
The average effective parental fee for formal childcare was cut in half, and subsidies were
extended to so-called guestparent care (small-scale care at the home of the ‘guestparent’
or at the home of the children). As a result, public spending on childcare skyrocketed,
from 1 billion euro in 2004 to 3 billion euro (0.5% of GDP) in 2009. Over the same period,
the government also increased targeted earned income tax credits (EITCs) for the same
parents. Budgetary outlays of these EITCs increased from 0.7 billion euro in 2004 to 1.3
billion euro in 2009. Since both policies target the same treatment group, the modest
labour supply effects we find are the combined treatment effects of the childcare and the
EITC reform.
We estimate the effect of the joint reform using data from the Labour Force Survey
of Statistics Netherlands for the period 1995-2009, employing a differences-in-differences
(DD) strategy. We estimate the effect on the participation rate and hours worked per
week. The treatment group consists of parents 20 to 50 years of age with a youngest
child up to 12 years of age. As a control group we use parents 20 to 50 years of age with
a youngest child 12 to 17 years of age. This control group is chosen because the trends
in participation and average hours worked per week of the treatment and control group
are very similar before the reform, and placebo treatment dummies are insignificant.
Unfortunately, we do not have linked individual data on labour supply and the use of
childcare. Hence, we estimate an intention-to-treat effect.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the reform increased the partici-
pation rate of women in the treatment group by 2.3 percentage points (3.0%). Second, the
reform increased the average number of hours worked per week by women in the treatment
group by 1.1 hours per week (6.2%), and reduced the hours worked per week by men in
the treatment group by 0.3 hours per week (0.8%). Third, the policy seems to have been
rather costly in terms of additional government spending per additional person and per
additional fulltime equivalent employed. Spending on childcare subsidies and EITCs for
parents with young children increased by 2.6 billion euro, whereas the treatment effect on
the number of persons and fulltime equivalents employed was just 30 thousand additional
persons and 30 thousand additional fulltime equivalents, respectively. This suggests an
additional public spending of 87 thousand euro per additional person employed. Given
that modal wage income in 2009 was around 32,500 euro, and the average taxes paid on
this modal wage income were less than 10 thousand euro,1 the additional costs for the
1Own calculations using Microtax of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
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government seem to have been much larger than the additional receipts, even if we allow
for some additional savings on social assistance benefits (of approximately 14,000 euro
per person) for single parents that started to work.2 Why was the reform so costly? A
substantial share of the higher subsidies was paid to parents that already used formal
childcare at the lower pre-reform subsidy. In addition, the higher subsidy also caused a
large shift from informal to formal childcare. Indeed, a back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests only a 0.19 (0.23) percentage point increase in the maternal employment rate
per percentage point increase in the enrollment rate of children in daycare (out-of-school
care).
There is an extensive literature that considers the relationship between parental labour
supply and the cost of childcare using structural models and cross-sectional data. An in-
depth overview is given in Blau and Currie (2006), who report estimated (childcare) price
elasticities of female labour force participation ranging from 0.06 to −3.60. They argue
that only a small part of this variation is due to differences in the composition of the
sample or different data sources. Most of the variation seems to be due to identification
problems related to the endogeneity of the explanatory variables.3 To solve this problem,
exogenous variation in the cost of childcare is needed. Therefore, the focus has shifted
to quasi-experimental methods that use policy changes or discontinuities in policies as
exogenous variation in childcare prices for parents. As a result, there is a small but growing
body of quasi-experimental literature that studies the impact of changes or differences in
childcare costs on labour supply.
In Section 6 we give a detailed overview of estimated treatment effects and study char-
acteristics of related studies using natural experiments. A number of papers find rather
small labour supply effects: Lundin et al. (2008) for Sweden, Havnes and Mogstad (2011a)
for Norway and Fitzpatrick (2010) for the US. However, there are also a number of papers
that find substantial labour supply effects, overall or for subgroups, in particular Baker
et al. (2008) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) for a reform in Quebec. When we com-
pare our findings to related studies, our estimated treatment effects take an intermediate
position. One potential explanation for why we find smaller effects than e.g. Baker et al.
(2008) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) is that we consider data from a recent period,
where the pre-reform participation rate is already relatively high. However, some authors
(e.g. Goux and Maurin, 2010; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011a) also point to potential pitfalls
in the analysis of the reform in Quebec, where the treatment effect may in part have been
driven by differential trends and/or other reforms. One potential explanation for why
we find larger effects than the studies by Lundin et al. (2008) and Havnes and Mogstad
(2011a) is that both workers and non-workers are eligible for childcare subsidies in Norway
and Sweden, whereas only working single parents and two-earner couples are eligible for
childcare subsidies in the Netherlands. This can also explain why we find larger effects
than the US studies that consider differences in enrollment in pre-school, which is also
2In our data set we do not have information on how participation in formal childcare affects childrens’
outcomes, nor do we have information on the impact on the well-being of parents, as in Baker et al. (2008).
A full cost-benefit analysis of the reform we consider would have to take these effects into account, along
with distributional effects of the reform.
3For example, unobserved characteristics are likely to influence both the costs of childcare (which
depend on income) and the labour supply decision.
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universal and not targeted solely at working parents.
We make a number of contributions to the literature. First, we study a very recent
reform in a highly developed OECD country. This makes our results particularly relevant
for other highly developed OECD countries that are considering to expand their formal
childcare programs, since the initial maternal employment rate and public spending on
childcare are arguably quite similar to many of these countries.4 Indeed, as shown in
Section 6, the effect of expanding subsidized childcare on maternal employment rates is
lower in countries with a high initial maternal employment rate. Furthermore, being one
of the few studies to use the Labour Force Survey, we can also determine the effect on
hours worked, next to the effect on the participation rate. We find that the effect on
hours worked by women is twice as large as the effect on the participation rate of women
in percentage terms. Also, we study a reform that expands subsidies for both daycare and
out-of-school care. To the best of our knowledge we are the first quasi-experimental study
to look at the effect of out-of-school care on parental labour supply. Finally, our study
is also unique in that we have ten years of pre-reform data and five years of post-reform
data. This enables us to do placebo tests in a number of pre-reform periods, and to study
both the short- and medium-run effects.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main aspects of the
reform we exploit in the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology.
In Section 4 we present our dataset and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 gives
the estimation results for participation and hours worked. In Section 6 we compare
our findings and study characteristics with related quasi-experimental studies. Section 7
concludes. An online appendix contains supplementary material.
2 The reform
In the beginning of the 1970s, the employment rate of women (15–64 years of age) in the
Netherlands, close to 30%, was rather low by international standards; see Figure 1. But
following the economic crisis in the early 1980s, the employment rate of women in the
Netherlands started to rise.5 The strong rise in the participation rate of Dutch women
continued all the way up to the reforms in 2005–2009, which we consider below. Indeed,
by 2004 the participation rate of women in the Netherlands was among the highest in the
OECD, close to 70%, falling just short of the participation rates in Norway, Sweden and
the US.
Whereas the participation rate of women in the Netherlands showed a strong rise
since the mid 1980s, a sizeable gap remained in terms of hours worked per week by
employed women; see Figure 2. Furthermore, the gap with other OECD countries has been
rather stable over time. In 2004, employed women in the Netherlands worked on average
approximately 24 hours per week, while their counterparts in other OECD countries
worked 5 to 10 hours per week more. Indeed, in 2004, the share of women working
4See e.g. OECD (2007, Table 3.2, Chart 6.1).
5For a detailed analysis of trends in female labour force participation in the Netherlands, see Euwals
et al. (2011). Over the past decades, the rise in participation by mothers of young children was particularly
strong.
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Figure 1: Participation rate by women 15–64 years of age: 1975–2009
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part-time in the Netherlands was 60%, by far the largest share in the OECD (OECD,
2013).
To further promote the labour force participation of Dutch women, in persons but also
in hours per week, the Dutch government implemented a series of reforms in the period
2005–2009. The two main goals of the reforms were: i) to make it easier for parents to
combine work and care, and ii) to promote good quality care. With i) the government also
planned to stimulate the labour force participation of parents (Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment, 2012, p.2). The most important changes took place in 2006 and 2007
when childcare subsidies were increased such that on average the parental fee decreased
by 50%. Below, following a brief introduction into the pre-reform childcare market in the
Netherlands, we give a historical account of the policy changes over the period 2005–2009,
and indicate their relative importance for our analysis.
Children in the Netherlands go to primary school when they turn 4, and most children
are 12 years old when they go to secondary school. Before the age of 4, children can go to
centre-based daycare, so-called playgroups and informal care. Before the introduction of
the Law on Childcare (Wet kinderopvang) in 2005, centre-based daycare was subsidized
at different rates.6 The majority (76%) of places was subsidized directly by employers
and local governments.7 These places had lower effective parental fees than so-called
‘unsubsidized’ places (24%), the costs of which were however partly tax deductible for
parents. To qualify for the subsidies and tax deduction, both parents for two-parent
households and one parent for single-parent households need to work. The total enrollment
rate of children 0–3 years of age in centre-based care was 25% in 2004. Next to centre-
based care a large number of children also go to playgroups (peuterspeelzalen). This
is part-time care for less than 4 hours per day, mostly used by families in which one
of the parents does not work. The enrollment rate of children 0–3 in playgroups was
also close to 25%. Children that are in primary school can go to centre-based out-of-
school care and informal care. Similar to daycare, before the introduction of the Law on
Childcare, subsidized and unsubsidized centre-based out-of-school care places co-existed,
where the costs of unsubsidized places were partly tax deductible for parents. The pre-
reform enrollment rate of 4–12 year olds in centre-based care was below 6% in 2004.
The introduction of the Law on Childcare in 2005 unified the subsidies for centre-based
care. From 2005 onwards, all centre-based places qualified for the same subsidy from the
government, and subsidies were no longer transferred directly to childcare institutions but
to parents using formal childcare. This increased the subsidy for parents with children
going to an unsubsidized place before 2005 (before the reform they were eligible for a
tax deduction that was typically lower than the subsidy after the reform). With the
introduction of the Law on Childcare so-called guestparent care also became eligible for
subsidies, becoming part of formal childcare. Guestparent care is small-scale care at the
home of the guestparent or at the home of the children. The Law on Childcare in 2005 was
the start of the reforms we consider in our empirical analysis below, but the unification
of the subsidies and the extension to guestparent care had only a minor (initial) effect on
6All data on the use of formal childcare in Section 2 are from Statistics Netherlands
(http://statline.cbs.nl).
7The subsidy is per hour of formal childcare.
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Table 1: Public spending on childcare and EITCs for parents (millions of euro)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Childcare subsidies 725 755 1028 1,001 1,343 2,058 2,825 3,034
EITCs for parents 410 460 738 830 871 984 971 1,290
– Combinatiekortinga 410 460 479 484 314 324 247 0
– Inkomensafhankelijke combinatiekortingb 0 0 259 346 557 660 724 1,290
Source: Ministry of Finance (2010) and own calculations (imputation of employers’ contribution for childcare up to 2007 with data
from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (personal communication) and split of the EITCs for parents in its two components
using the MIMOSI model of CPB). aThe Combinatiekorting applies to primary earners, secondary earners and working single parents
with a youngest child up to 12 years of age. bThe Inkomensafhankelijke combinatiekorting applies to secondary earners and working
single parents with a youngest child up to 12 years of age.
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public spending on formal childcare; see Table 1. Indeed, presumably because the subsidy
was slightly reduced for the highest incomes,8 public spending actually fell slightly from
2004 to 2005. Figure 3 shows that the share of children in formal childcare in 2005 hardly
changed relative to the preceding period. Hence, in our empirical analysis we do not
expect to find significant labour supply effects for 2005.
In 2006 and 2007 the subsidy rate was increased drastically. Figure 4 shows the
resulting changes in the parental contribution rate for the ‘first child’ between 2005 and
2007.9 First, note that the parental fee depends on the income of the household. In all
years, households with the lowest income receive the highest subsidy (up to 96% of the
full price). For households with a low income the subsidy rate hardly changed between
2005 and 2007. For middle income households the subsidy rate went up by 20 to 40
percentage points, whereas the increase in the subsidy for the highest income households
was smaller than for middle income households. On average, the parental cost share in
the full price dropped from 37% in 2005 to 18% in 2007.10 Indeed, parents were the main
beneficiaries of the reform as average prices of formal childcare places grew more or less
in line with the CPI, despite the steep increase in the subsidy rate.11 Hence, the increase
in the subsidy rate was not counteracted by a rise in the full price of childcare charged
by childcare institutions to parents. Next to the drop in parental fees, from 2007 onwards
schools were obliged to act as an intermediary for parents and childcare institutions to
arrange out-of-school care. Finally, in 2009, we saw a small reversal of the policy change,
as the government reduced the subsidy for parents to some extent (see Figure 4), but
compared to 2005 there was still a large drop in the parental fee for middle and high
income households.12
Figure 3 shows that the dramatic drop in the contribution rate in 2006 and 2007
spurred the growth in the use of formal childcare in 2006 and beyond.13 Due to the rise
in the subsidy per child and the higher participation in formal childcare, public spending
on childcare rose quickly from 1 billion euro in 2005 to 3 billion euro in 2009; see Table 1.
In DD analyses it is crucial to consider other policies that might influence the out-
come variables for the treatment or control group (differently).14 We carefully examined
8See Plantenga et al. (2005).
9The Tax Office defines the first child as the child for which the parents have the highest childcare
expenditures.
10Source: Tax Office data provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (personal com-
munication).
11Over 2005–2009 the average full price for an hour of daycare and out-of-school care grew by 9.6%
and 6.0%, respectively (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 2009), while the CPI grew by 6.5%
(CPB, 2012).
12Since childcare subsidies expanded more for middle income households than for high and low income
households, larger labour supply effects are expected for the former households. Unfortunately, we cannot
perform this exercise, because data on household income is not included in our dataset (the Labour Force
Survey).
13Survey results from Berden and Kok (2009) indicate that there was a large shift from informal to
formal care between 2004 and 2008: for children 0–3, 4–7 and 8–12 years of age, the share of parents
using formal care in the total of parents using formal and informal care rose from respectively 58 to 77%,
22 to 54% and 21 to 44%.
14Another concern might be that what we see is not the result of an increase in childcare demand but
the result of a drop in rationing on the formal childcare market. However, the available data on waiting
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various changes in taxes and subsidies and found that, apart from one, there were no
substantial changes in taxes or subsidies targeted at the treatment or control group. The
only complication comes from changes in the EITCs for parents with a youngest child up
to 12 years old, the Combinatiekorting (Combination credit) and the Inkomensafhanke-
lijke combinatiekorting (Income dependent combination credit). These EITCs are also
targeted exclusively at our treatment group. Figure 5 shows the change in the sum of
the Combinatiekorting and Inkomensafhankelijke combinatiekorting for secondary earners
and single parents (mostly women) over the period 2001–2009. Table 1 gives the changes
in aggregate ‘spending’ (revenue losses) on these EITCs. Between 2001 and 2004 these
credits increased from 138 to 514 euro, and public expenditures increased from 410 to
738 million euros between 2002 and 2004. Between 2004 and 2008 the individual subsidy
increased from 514 euro to 858 euro for secondary earners and single parents, and in
2009 there was another increase for secondary earners and single parents with relatively
high earnings.15 In 2009, the maximum credit was 1,765 euro, where the maximum was
reached at 30,803 euro of gross individual income (for comparison, in 2009 the minimum
wage of a fulltime worker was 16,776 euro). Since these credits target the same group
as childcare subsidies we can only determine the joint effect of the changes in childcare
subsidies and these credits.16 The EITC reform presumably served to increase the labour
supply of the treatment group, meaning that this does not affect our conclusion that the
effect on employment was modest given the budgetary impulse.17
3 Methodology
We estimate the effect of the reform on labour participation using a DD strategy (see e.g.
Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). This method estimates
the effect of a reform by comparing the change in outcomes of the treatment group before
and after the reform, using the change in outcomes of a control group to control for
common time effects. Our treatment group consists of parents influenced by the change
in childcare costs, which are parents with a youngest child up to 12 years of age.
As the control group we use parents with a youngest child 12 to 18 years of age (living
at home). These parents are not eligible for childcare subsidies but are otherwise quite
similar to the treatment group. The DD estimator requires that in the absence of the
lists suggest that these are rather small, and that the change in waiting lists was much smaller than the
change in filled childcare places. For example, the survey data reported in Van Rens and Smit (2011)
suggest that the waiting list for daycare (out-of-school care) dropped from 10% (11%) of filled places
in 2007 (the first year of the survey) to 7% (6%) of filled places in 2009. The drop in waiting lists is
much smaller than the increase in the number of children going to daycare and out-of-school care, which
increased by 49% (19%) and 139% (55%) respectively between 2005 and 2009 (2007 and 2009).
15The tax credit for working primary earners (mostly men) with young children was phased out over
the period 2005–2009.
16Also note that the change in the credits for working parents in 2009 was mostly targeted at middle
and high income earners, like the childcare reform.
17De Boer et al. (2014, Table 5) simulate the EITC reform with a structural model. They find that the
reform increased both the participation rate and the hours worked per week of mothers with a youngest
child 0–11 years of age living in couples.
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policy reform the treatment and control group face a common time trend in labour force
participation. This assumption cannot be tested. However, we have ten years of pre-
reform data, so we can check whether the groups have a similar trend in the pre-reform
period. In general, we estimate an event history specification, allowing leads and lags
around the reform to have different coefficients.
This assumption could be violated if the government was anticipating a change in
behaviour when deciding to pass the new law. Also, if parents anticipated the policy
change and adapted their behaviour in advance, this too would create a problem for
identification of the treatment effect. In our case, both issues are unlikely. First, inspection
of the data shows that there is no change in the long-term trend in the years before the
reform that could have induced the policy changes from 2005 onwards. Second, the most
important policy change is the reduction of the parental fee in 2006–2007. Since this
reduction was not included in the Law on Childcare of 2005, parents were unable to
anticipate these changes before 2005. Both assumptions are supported by the outcomes
of the placebo tests that we report in Section 5.
Finally, the common trend assumption is violated if the composition of characteristics
related to our outcomes within the groups is not stable. This could happen if for example
the childcare reform led to a change in fertility rates (since our treatment group is defined
by having a young child this would alter the composition of the treatment group).18 We
constructed and inspected fertility rates but found no evidence of a change in trends after
2005.19
To estimate the treatment effect on participation, we regress participation status on
year fixed effects (αt), group fixed effects (γg), individual characteristics (Xi) and a set of
treatment dummies for each year after the reform (Dgs):
yigt = αt + γg +Xiβ +
2009∑
s=2005
δsDgs + εigt. (1)
Dgs is a set of dummies equal to one if individual i has a youngest child up to 12 years of
age in year s. The common trend of the treatment and control group is captured by the
year fixed effects, while the constant difference in participation between the treatment
and control group is captured by the group fixed effects. We include different group
fixed effects for parents with a youngest child 0–3, 4–7 and 8–11 years of age. Individual
18Figure A.1 shows that each characteristic develops smoothly for both the treatment and control
group. The proverbial exception is the ethnicity dummy, the increase in the share of immigrants in 2000
is caused by a change in the definition of this group, however our results are very similar when we exclude
the ethnicity dummy from the regressions. We have also run regressions of the covariates on year fixed
effects, the group dummies and the treatment dummies. The results for the treatment dummies in Table
A.4 indicate that some covariates are correlated with the treatment dummies. However, it is unlikely that
these results reflect endogenous responses to the reform (e.g. education, ethnicity and age are presumably
fixed), rather they indicate small differences in the trend growth of the covariates between the treatment
and control group. Regression results indeed show that it is important to control for these individual
characteristics. A concern is then that there are also unobserved differential changes in the treatment and
control group. However, we do not find support for this hypothesis since the placebo treatment dummies
are not significantly different from zero.
19None of the other quasi-experimental studies discussed in Section 6 that look at fertility finds a
significant effect on fertility.
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characteristics are included to control for observable changes in the composition of the
groups over time. In equation (1) we allow the treatment effect to be different in each
year after the policy change. When the annual treatment effects are not significantly
different from one another, we instead estimate two treatment effects: a treatment effect
for 2005–2007 (short-run) and a treatment effect for 2008–2009 (medium-run).
According to the modified Breusch-Pagan test, the hypothesis of homoskedasticity
is strongly rejected for both the participation and hours equation. Therefore, we use
population weights in estimation to correct for heteroskedastic error terms.20 Table A.5
and Table A.6 show that the estimates of the treatment effects are very similar when we
apply standard OLS without weights.
To further correct for potential heteroskedasticity we report robust standard errors.
For the main regressions, in the online appendix we also report standard errors clustered
at the year-group level,21 and standard errors clustered at the group level,22 (see Table A.5
and Table A.6). In the majority of cases, clustered standard errors are smaller than robust
standard errors. We prefer to be conservative and report the larger (robust) standard
errors (as suggested by Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Furthermore, the conclusions are
robust across the alternative specifications for the standard errors.
Participation is a discrete variable, so equation (1) is a linear probability model for
participation. We also estimate the effect on hours worked per week. We follow Angrist
and Pischke (2009) and estimate a linear model with the same sample of individuals that
we use in the participation equation. So we estimate equation (1) with y denoting the
number of hours worked per week, potentially zero.
4 Data
We use data from the Dutch Labour Force Survey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking) of Statistics
Netherlands. This is an annual survey which includes approximately 80,000 individuals
per year. We have repeated cross-sections for the period 1995–2009. The reform started in
2005, so we have a long data series preceding the policy change to study the common trend
assumption crucial in DD analyses. The finding of a common trend before the reform is
taken as an indication that the trend would remain the same in the absence of the re-
form. The survey includes labour supply information (participation and hours worked per
week), individual characteristics (age, education level, native/immigrant, couple/single)
and household characteristics (number of children, age of the children).23
From this dataset we select our treatment group of mothers with a youngest child up
to 12 years of age. Furthermore we restrict the analysis to mothers 20 to 50 years of age.
20Following the recommendation of Solon et al. (2013).
2164 clusters: 4 groups, youngest child 0–3, 4–7, 8–11 and 12–17 years of age, times 16 time periods.
224 clusters: youngest child 0–3, 4–7, 8–11 and 12–17 years of age.
23For each year we restrict our sample to individuals that were interviewed in person. Apart from
these, there were three follow-up interviews of the same individual within one year by telephone. Since
these are considered less reliable and are basically the same observation (see Statistics Netherlands, 2009),
we decided to use only the data from the interviews in person. Unfortunately, we could not make this
distinction for 2009, so we have about four times more observations in 2009 than in the other years, but
the sample weights correct for this.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics treatment and control
group (1995–2009)
Treatment group Control group
Participation 0.664 0.709
Hours worked per week 14.44 16.63
Age 35.73 44.00
Lower educated 0.292 0.400
Middle educated 0.461 0.423
Higher educated 0.247 0.177
Single 0.095 0.144
Immigrant 0.207 0.165
Household size 3.918 3.812
Age youngest child 4.459 14.361
Observations 202,104 61,125
Values are means weighted with sample weights. Source: Labour Force
Survey (Statistics Netherlands).
This gives us 202,104 observations for the treatment group (for the full sample period).
As a control group we use mothers with a youngest child 12 to 18 years of age. Restricting
the control group to mothers 20 to 50 years of age we have 61,125 observations in the
control group. We also considered women without children as a potential control group.
However, as we will see below, this is not a valid control group since they have a different
pre-reform trend in the participation rate and hours worked than the treatment group.
Table 2 gives descriptives statistics for the treatment and control group. The table
shows the outcome variables participation and hours worked per week, and the covariates
age (in the regression we use 5-year category dummies), education (in categories lower,
middle and higher educated), a dummy for being single, a dummy for being an immigrant,
the size of the household (in the regression we include dummies for families with one, two
or three and more children below the age of 12) and the age of the youngest child (with
separate dummies for 0–3, 4–7 and 8–11 years of age). For most variables, the treatment
and control group are quite similar. Mothers in the control group are somewhat more
likely to be single, and are also somewhat more likely to be lower educated. The share
of immigrants is slightly higher in the treatment group, which could be explained by
the higher fertility rate of immigrants. There are sizeable differences between the groups
with respect to the age of the mother and the age of the youngest child, however this is
inevitable considering the definition of the groups.
In the DD method we compare the outcomes of the treatment and control group
over time. In Figure 6 we plot participation rates of the women in the treatment group
(youngest child 0–11), the control group (youngest child 12–17) and for women without
children (a potential control group). The solid vertical line marks the start of the policy
reform. We see that both the treatment and control group exhibit an upward trend before
the policy change, while participation is always higher for the control group. Furthermore,
the rate of growth is very similar for the two groups, whereas women without children
13
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clearly have a different pre-reform trend.24 This suggests that women with an older child
are an appropriate control group for our DD analysis, whereas women without children
are not.
In Figure 7 we plot the average number of hours worked per week. Again we see that
there is a clear upward trend, both in the treatment group and our control group, whereas
the upward trend is absent in the group of women without children. Again, women with
an older child seem an appropriate control group, and women without children do not.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Participation rate
We first present the estimation results for the effect of the reform on the participation rate
of all women in the treatment group, and subsequently consider the results for subgroups.
We first estimate equation (1) for the participation rate, without any individual or
household characteristics and with two treatment effects, one for 2005–2007 and one for
2008–2009.25 Estimates are presented in column (1) in Table 3. In the first three years
the effect is 2.7 percentage points, while in the last two years it is 4.2 percentage points,
both significantly different from zero. In column (2) we include individual characteristics.
Controlling for changes in the observed characteristics, the effects drop to 1.5 percentage
points and 2.3 percentage points (a 3.0% increase), respectively.26,27
A concern might be that some women that were in the treatment group in the early
years are in the control group in the later years. When there is a treatment effect on the
participation rate of mothers extending beyond the treatment period (due to for example
a career effect), part of the treatment effect may be masked by an effect on the control
group.28 Therefore we also estimate the model using only parents with a child 16–17 years
of age in the control group so that individuals in the control group that were previously
24There appears to be somewhat of a wobble in the participation rate in the control group around 2003–
2004. However, when we add a placebo treatment dummy for 2003–2004, it is not significantly different
from zero, and the treatment effect is virtually unchanged, see below in Table 3. As an additional check
we also looked at the mean values for the covariates for the control group, but these show no sudden
changes around 2003, see Figure A.1 in the online appendix.
25Results of estimating the model with annual treatment dummies for 2005–2009 are shown in Table
A.1 in the online appendix. We can not reject that the treatment effects per year are equal. However,
the results suggest a difference between the effects in 2005–2007 and 2008–2009. We therefore decided to
estimate and present results with separate treatment effects for 2005–2007 and 2008–2009. These might
be considered the short- and medium-run effects of the reform.
26The estimates of the coefficients of the control variables are all significant and in line with expecta-
tions, see Table A.1 in the online appendix. The linear probability model may predict values outside the
[0,1] interval. We find that only 0.14% of the predicted values are outside this interval.
27For the two treatment effects we still cannot reject that they are equal. When we estimate one single
treatment effect for 2005–2009, we obtain a treatment effect of 1.8 percentage points (significant at the
1% level).
28The results on career effects of the studies discussed in Section 6 are mixed. Lefebvre et al. (2009)
find significant long-run effects for lower-educated mothers, Nollenberger and Rodŕıguez-Planas (2015)
find that the effect on participation reaches its maximum two years after the treatment and then fades
away.
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Table 3: Effect on participation rate: all women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WLS WLS WLS WLS M-DD WLS
95–09 95–09 95–09 95–09 95–09 95–09






Treat 05–07 0.027∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.016∗ -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Treat 08–09 0.042∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Observations 263,229 263,229 219,961 263,229 263,229 202,104
Robust standard errors in parentheses, standard errors in column (5) are bootstrapped, * denotes significant at 10% level,
** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Individual characteristics (except in (1)), group fixed effects and year fixed effects are
included but not reported. aThe control group consists of parents with a youngest child aged 16–17, so we exclude individuals
in the control group that were previously in the treatment group.
Table 4: Effect on participation rate: subgroups of women (WLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single Women Youngest Youngest Youngest
women in couples child 0–3 child 4–7 child 8–11
Treat 05-07 0.030 0.011∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.012
(0.019) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Treat 08-09 0.047∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.018) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 26,453 236,776 155,163 119,429 110,887
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and
*** at 1% level. Individual characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included
but not reported.
in the treatment group are excluded. This results in the effects reported in column (3).
The effect is somewhat larger than our base results, though not significantly different.
The validity of our estimates depends critically on the common trend assumption. To
further assess the plausibility of this assumption we also estimate a placebo treatment
effect. Specifically, we estimate a treatment effect for some years before 2005. Since no
relevant policy change occured in this period (that differs between the treatment and
control group) we should not find a significant effect. We estimate a placebo treatment
effect for 2000–2002 and for 2003–2004. The placebo effects and the two treatment effects
are reported in column (4). Both placebo treatment effects are not significantly different
from zero, while both treatment effects are hardly affected by the inclusion of the placebo
dummies.29
As another robustness check we report estimates based on a matching-differences-in-
differences approach (see for example Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). The combination of
matching and differences-in-differences weakens the required assumptions of each of these
methods separately. We create cells based on marital status, ethnicity, education level and
number of children. We calculate the average participation in each cell-year combination
for both the control and the treatment group and compute the differences-in-differences
estimate for each cell. We then average over all estimates, weighting by the population
share of the cell in the treatment group.30 The estimates are presented in column (5) and
are very close to the baseline effects.
Finally, we show results of a simple differencing model for only the treatment group,
including a quadratic time trend (column (6)). This leads to a zero effect in 2005–2007
and a positive effect of 3.3 percentage points in 2008–2009.
We also estimate the effect for the following subgroups of women: i) single women,
ii) women in couples, iii) women with a youngest child 0–3 years of age (pre primary
29Table A.7 in the online appendix shows that using 2003–2004 as the base years and including a
placebo treatment dummy for 1995–1999 and 2000–2002 again results in insignificant placebo treatment
dummies.
30The exact estimator is defined as follows. Define cells j ∈ J for each combination of the values of the
covariates (there are 36 cells in our application). The variable of interest (participation or hours worked)
of individual i, in year t belongs to one particular cell j and to the treatment group (d = 1) or the control
group (d = 0), and is denoted by Y dijt. We define three periods p = 0, 1, 2, which are the pre-reform
period (1995–2004), the short-term post-reform period (2005–2007) and the medium-term post-reform
period (2008–2009). The average outcome in cell j of group d in period p is given by:
Ȳ dj,p =
1∑









With ki,t is the individual’s weight within a cell, which is based on the population weights that we use in
all regressions. The treatment effect estimator (for the short-term effect, p = 1) is given by the weighted






(Ȳ treatj,1 − Ȳ treatj,0 )− (Ȳ controlj,1 − Ȳ controlj,0 )
]
And similar for the medium-term effect, p = 2. The weight of each cell in the sample is denoted by αj
and is based on the distribution of covariates of the treated individuals in the post-reform period.
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school), iv) 4–7 years of age (first years in primary school), and v) 8–11 years of age
(last years in primary school). We do this by estimating equation (1) for each subsample,
thereby allowing differences in coefficients for all covariates between subgroups. Results
are reported for these groups in Table 4. In columns (1) and (2) we find that the effect
on the participation rate of single women is higher than for women in couples. Next,
columns (3), (4) and (5) suggest that the effect on the participation rate is larger for
women with a child in daycare or a child in the first grades of primary school than for
women with a child in the later grades of primary school. Since older children are less
likely to go to childcare, and we are estimating an intention-to-treat effect, this is in line
with expectations.31 The placebo treatment dummies for 2000–2004 are insignificant for
all subgroups except for women with a youngest child aged 0-3.32
5.2 Hours worked per week
In addition to participation we are also interested in the effect on hours worked per week.
Again we start with the results for all women, and subsequently consider the results for
subgroups.33
As discussed in Section 3 we estimate equation (1) with average hours worked per week
as the outcome variable and including all women in this regression, both working women
and non-working women. We estimate a separate treatment dummy for 2005–2007 and
for 2008–2009. Results for the estimation without covariates are reported in column (1) in
Table 5. We find a significantly positive effect of 1.0 hours per week in 2005–2007, and 1.6
hours per week in 2008–2009. When we include covariates, in column (2), the treatment
effects drop again, but remain positive and significant at the 1% level in both periods.
In 2005–2007 the estimated effect is an increase of 0.7 hours per week. In 2008–2009 the
effect is 1.1 hours per week. Given the average number of hours worked per week for
women of 18.4 in 2008–2009, these effects are more substantial in percentage terms (6.2%
in 2008–2009) than the effects on the participation rate (3.0% in 2008–2009).
When we restrict the control group to mothers with a youngest child 16–17 years of
age, such that they were never in the treatment group, we find that the estimated effect
on hours is again somewhat larger; see column (3). Column (4) presents the effects on
hours worked when we add two placebo treatment dummies, for 2000–2002 and 2003–
2004. The first placebo dummy is negative and significant at the 10% level, the second is
not significantly different from zero.34 Both the short- and medium-run treatment effects
are somewhat lower than in column (2).
31In Figures A.2 and A.3 in the online appendix we show treatment effects per age of the youngest
child, for 2005–2007 and 2008–2009, respectively. These results also show a declining pattern with age of
the youngest child.
32These results are available in Table A.2 in the online appendix.
33For the hours worked analysis we restrict the sample period to 1997-2009. Inspection of the trends
showed that in 1995-1996 trends might be slightly different, such that we decided to exclude these early
years from the hours analysis.
34Table A.7 in the online appendix shows that using 2003–2004 as the base years and including a
placebo treatment dummy for the periods before 2003 results in insignificant placebo treatment dummies
for hours worked per week.
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Table 5: Effect on hours worked per week: all women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WLS WLS WLS WLS M-DD WLS
97–09 97–09 97–09 97–09 97–09 97–09






Treat 05–07 1.033∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗ 0.384 0.817∗∗∗ -0.134
(0.207) (0.198) (0.356) (0.246) (0.237) (0.173)
Treat 08–09 1.570∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.194) (0.336) (0.243) (0.250) (0.344)
Observations 231,097 231,097 192,962 231,097 231,097 177,286
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Individual
characteristics (except in (1)), group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included but not reported. aThe control group
consists of parents with a youngest child aged 16–17, so we exclude individuals in the control group that were previously in
the treatment group.
Table 6: Effect on hours worked per week: subgroups of women (WLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single Women Youngest Youngest Youngest
women in couples child 0–3 child 4–7 child 8–11
Treat 05–07 1.090∗ 0.552∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗ 0.309
(0.623) (0.207) (0.218) (0.241) (0.254)
Treat 08–09 1.680∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 1.418∗∗∗ 1.226∗∗∗ 0.408
(0.609) (0.203) (0.215) (0.239) (0.250)
Observations 23,945 207,152 135,545 105,170 98,004
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and
*** at 1% level. Individual characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included
but not reported.




Treatment 05-07 0.005 –0.108
(0.004) (0.238)
Treatment 08-09 0.003 –0.344
(0.004) (0.216)
Observations 224,674 195,879
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant
at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Individual
characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are
included but not reported.
In column (5) we present results from the matching-differences-in-differences estimator
as defined in the previous section. The results are very similar to the baseline results
in column (2). In column (6) we present results from a simple difference model, only
including the treatment group and a quadratic trend. The treatment effect for 2005–2007
is not significantly different from zero, the treatment effect for 2008–2009 is close to our
baseline estimate.
For subgroups of women we report estimates in Table 6. The pattern is similar to the
results for participation. The effect for single women is again larger than for women in
couples and the total effect can be attributed mainly to women with a child younger than
8 years of age. For hours worked, the placebo treatment dummies are insignificant for
all subgroups except women in couples and women with a youngest child 0–3 years old.35
Recall we are identifying the treatment effects of the joint reform and not solely of the
childcare reform. The differential effects across subgroups therefore might be confounded
by heterogenous effects of the EITC expansion.
5.3 Results for men
The effects for men are much less pronounced. We briefly report the main results in Table
7.36 We find no significant effect on the participation rate of men in any treatment year
in any specification.37 We also check for an effect on the participation rate for subgroups.
We find no significant effect for most subgroups.
We find a negative coefficient on hours worked per week for men, increasing in mag-
nitude to –0.3 hours in 2008-2009. However, the coefficient is not significantly different
from zero. For men with a youngest child 0–3 years old we find a significant negative
effect on hours worked of –0.5 hours per week. The drop in hours worked by these men
35Placebo treatment effects can be found in Table A.3 in the online appendix.
36Detailed results can be found in Table A.8–A.11 in the online appendix. Figures A.6 and A.7 plot
the participation rates and hours worked per week for men, respectively.
37When we limit the control group to men with a youngest child 16 or 17 years old, the coefficient on
the treatment effect becomes slightly negative for 2008–2009 and significant at the 10% level.
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may be the result of the increase in the labour supply of their partners.
6 Discussion
How do our results compare to the findings of related studies? Table 8 gives an overview
of quasi-experimental studies that study the effect of changes in subsidized childcare or
eligibility for (pre-)school on the labour force participation of parents.38 For each study
we report subsequently: the country under consideration, a brief description of the re-
form/instrument and the treatment group, the pre-reform or counterfactual participation
rate and hours worked per week (including the zeros for the non-participants), the sample
period, the share of part-time employment in total employment, and finally the treatment
effect on the participation rate (in percentage points) and on hours worked per week.39
We divide the studies into two groups, ‘intention-to-treat’ studies and ‘IV’ studies.
The reported treatment effects for the IV studies measure the effect corresponding to an
increase in the enrollment rate of children in childcare or pre-school by 1 percentage point
(multiplied by 100 for the participation rate). The reported treatment effects for the
intention-to-treat studies correspond to different changes in enrollment rates of children
in childcare or pre-school. Therefore, to ease the comparison, below we also present back-
of-the-envelope calculations of an ‘IV’ treatment effect for some intention-to-treat studies
using information on changes in the enrollment rates of children in childcare or pre-school.
First, consider the effect on the participation rate. Looking at the column ‘TE PR’
(treatment effect, participation rate) of Table 8, we find that our treatment effect takes
an intermediate position. For the whole group of mothers with a youngest child 0–11
years of age, we find an increase in the participation rate of 2.3 percentage points. This
is larger than the effects reported for the reforms in Sweden and Norway by respectively
Lundin et al. (2008) and Havnes and Mogstad (2011a), comparable to the effects reported
by Nollenberger and Rodŕıguez-Planas (2015) for the reform in Spain, but substantially
smaller than the effects reported by Baker et al. (2008) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008)
for the reform in Quebec.40
However, the comparison is complicated by the fact that we are comparing treatment
effects for different impulses, and for different treatment groups. To ease the comparison
with other studies we can calculate the increase in the participation rate of mothers per
percentage point increase in the enrollment rate of children in childcare or pre-school,
following e.g. Cascio (2009). Furthermore, most other studies focus on mothers with
young children, so we will do the calculation for mothers with a youngest child 0–3 years
of age. For this group we find a treatment effect of 2.5 percentage points. The data
underlying Figure 3 show that the enrollment rate for children 0–3 years of age increased
38The exact references of the reported treatment effects can be found in Table A.12 in the online
appendix.
39The data on part-time employment in total employment are taken from the OECD Labour Force
Statistics. The data are for all women and men. Unfortunately, the OECD does not report part-time
shares for the subgroups we consider.
40The treatment effect of Lundin et al. (2008) is not directly comparable to the other numbers since
it measures the childcare price elasticity of the employment rate of mothers. However, what is the most


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by 13.2 percentage points over the period 2004–2009 (the last year of the pre-reform
period to the last year of the reform period for which we have data).41 This suggests
a 0.19 (0.025/0.132) percentage point increase in the participation rate of mothers with
a youngest child 0–3 years of age per percentage point increase in the enrollment of
children 0–3 years of age in formal childcare.42 This is larger than the 0.06 calculated for
Norway by Havnes and Mogstad (2011a), comparable to the 0.18 calculated for Spain by
Nollenberger and Rodŕıguez-Planas (2015) but substantially smaller than the 0.55 which
we can calculate for the reform in Quebec of Baker et al. (2008).43
One reason that can explain why we find smaller effects than Baker et al. (2008)
for Quebec is that we consider data from a relatively recent period, where the pre-reform
participation rate of mothers was already relatively high. As argued by e.g. Cascio (2009)
and Fitzpatrick (2012), studies that use data from a later period are therefore more likely
to find smaller effects, as childcare subsidies are then more likely to be inframarginal to
the participation decision.44 However, we should note that some studies (e.g. Goux and
Maurin, 2010; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011a) have also expressed concerns about the studies
on the reform in Quebec, where pre-reform trends seem to differ between the treatment
province and the control provinces and there were also other reforms occuring during the
same period as the childcare reform.45
A potential explanation for why the effect is larger than the effects reported by Lundin
et al. (2008) and Havnes and Mogstad (2011a), is that both workers and non-workers are
eligible for subsidized childcare in Sweden and Norway, whereas only working parents are
41This may include an increase in the enrollment rate due to other reasons than the reform. However,
since there is no control group for the use of formal childcare (we consider a nationwide reform), it is
hard to determine what the increase in enrollment would have been in the absence of the reform.
42A similar calculation for mothers with a youngest child 4–7 and 8–11 years of age is complicated by
the fact that we only have information on the enrollment rate of children for both age groups combined.
The enrollment rate of children in formal childcare in this age range increased by 9.6 percentage points
over the period 2004–2009. Applying this increase to both groups we obtain a 0.29 (0.028/0.096) and 0.16
(0.015/0.096) percentage point increase in the participation rate of mothers with a youngest child 4–7
and 8–11 years of age, respectively, per percentage point increase in the enrollment of their children in
formal childcare. However, since the enrollment rate of children 4–7 years of age is typically larger than
the enrollment rate of children 8-11 years of age, and hence probably also the increase in enrollment rate
in percentage points, the number is more likely to be smaller than 0.29 for mothers with a youngest child
4–7 years of age and more likely to be larger than 0.16 for mothers with a youngest child 8-11 years of age.
Unfortunately, we do not have information on the enrollment rate of formal childcare for the subgroups
of single mothers and mothers in couples, so we can not do the calculation for these subgroups.
43Baker et al. (2008, pp.711-713) report an additional increase in the enrollment rate in formal childcare
in Quebec of 14 percentage points relative to the rest of Canada. This suggests a 0.55 (0.077/0.14) per-
centage point increase in the participation rate of mothers per percentage point increase in the enrollment
rate of children in formal childcare.
44Blau and Kahn (2007) and Heim (2007) show that labour supply elasticities of women in the US have
fallen over time as their participation rate has increased. Cross-country support for the hypothesis that
labour supply elasticities are lower when participation rates are higher can be found in Bargain et al.
(2014).
45Indeed, when comparing the treatment effects with placebo reforms, Baker et al. (2008, p.731) note
that ”[B]y this method, the increase in care in Quebec is far outside anything seen in other provinces,
but the increase in mothers’ employment lacks significance.”
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eligible for subsidized childcare in the Netherlands.46 Indeed, only working single parents
and two-earner couples qualify for formal childcare subsidies in the Netherlands. This may
also explain why the effect for women in couples is bigger than the effect found by e.g.
Goux and Maurin (2010) and the effects of the US studies (Gelbach, 2002; Fitzpatrick,
2010, 2012), noting that for the US studies we should compare the treatment effects with
e.g. our back-of-the-envelope calculation of the ‘IV’ treatment effect (multiplied by 100)
of 19 percentage points for mothers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age. These studies
all focus on pre-school reforms, the (implicit) subsidy therefore does not have a work
requirement on the part of the parents.
Turning to the effect on hours worked per week, again our results take an intermediate
position. However, the effect we find for hours worked per week is relatively large when
compared to the effect on the participation rate.47 This may be related to the large
share of women that work part-time in the Netherlands. Indeed, despite the relatively
high participation rate, the hours worked per week per person in the treatment group
(including the zeros for non-participants) is still rather low. This leaves a lot of room for
the intensive margin to respond.
In line with the other studies (e.g. Cascio, 2009; Goux and Maurin, 2010; Fitzpatrick,
2012) we find that the treatment effect is larger for single mothers than for women in
couples.48
Finally, there is one other study that also reports effects on fathers. Using differences
in enforcement of out-of-school care in neighbouring cantons in Switzerland, Felfe et al.
(2013) find that whereas the share of full-time working women is higher when there is
more out-of-school care, the share of full-time working men is lower. This is in line with
our finding for fathers, they seem to have reduced their working hours in response to the
Dutch reform. However, note that the effect is only statistically significant for men with
a youngest child 0–3 years age.
7 Conclusion
Many countries seek to increase formal labour force participation of mothers. Policy-
makers often point to Scandinavia, where public spending on childcare is high and the
maternal employment rate is high as well. However, our analysis of a large recent reform
in the Netherlands, which cut the parental fee for formal childcare in half, suggests that
such a correlation can not necessarily be interpreted as a causal relation. We conclude
that the large policy reform in the Netherlands increased participation of women with
young children by a modest 2.3 percentage point or 3.0%. The hours worked effect is
46Working parents and individuals actively looking for work or enrolled in active labour market policies.
47Again, we can do a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the effect on hours worked per week per
percentage point increase in the enrollment rate of children in formal childcare. For mothers with a
youngest child 0–3, 4–7 and 8–11 years of age this yields respectively 10.6 (1.4/0.132), 12.5 (1.2/0.096)
and 4.2 (0.4/0.096). This is on average somewhat higher than Nollenberger and Rodŕıguez-Planas (2015)
who calculate an effect of 7.53 hours per week per percentage point increase in the enrollment rate of
children in childcare.
48According to Meghir and Phillips (2010) it is a stylized fact of empirical labour economics that single
parents are relatively responsive to financial incentives.
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larger though, an increase of 1.1 hours per week or 6.2%. This is partly counteracted by a
decrease in average hours worked by men of –0.3 per week, although the estimate for men
is not significantly different from zero. Recall that all these effects should be interpreted
as joint effects, as the government also increased EITCs for parents with young children
over the same period.
Our findings are quantitatively in between the findings of recent studies for Sweden
(Lundin et al., 2008) and Norway (Havnes and Mogstad, 2011a) that find very small
effects, and studies for Canada (Baker et al., 2008; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008) and some
other countries that find substantial effects. We believe that our results are particularly
relevant for many other highly developed OECD countries that face quite similar starting
conditions in terms of the maternal employment rate and public spending on childcare.
We have also shown that it is important to look beyond participation and also look at
hours worked per week.
In this paper we use the Dutch reform to study the relation between childcare subsidies
and labour force participation. However, the reform could also be used to investigate a
number of other relevant questions. Indeed, Baker et al. (2008) argue that a full evaluation
of publicly financed childcare requires answers to three questions, which we take up below.
First, how does public financing affect the quality and quantity of formal childcare, and
to what extent does it lead to substitution of informal childcare? This requires microdata
on the price and use of formal and informal childcare over time. One of the side effects
of the policy reform is that since 2005 we have potentially good microdata on the use of
formal childcare, since all subsidies now run via the Tax Office. However, finding reliable
informal childcare data remains a challenge.
Second, how do childcare subsidies affect labour force participation and what is the
net cost to the government? We have answered the first part of this question. For the
second part one needs to link the labour force participation data to the childcare data,
and to link these data to a tax-benefit calculator to determine the effects on government
receipts and expenditures.49 We do not have the data to do this exercise. However, the
expansion seems to have been rather costly. Between 2005 and 2009 expenditures on
childcare subsidies and EITCs for parents with young children increased by 2.6 billion
euro in total. This seems a rather large amount given that the increase in participation in
persons and in fulltime equivalents was about 30 thousand.50 Even after controlling for
some trend growth in these expenditures, the additional public expenditure per additional
working person or per additional working fulltime equivalent seems rather large.
Third, what is the effect of expanding formal childcare on children and families? There
are a number of papers that use the same reforms used in the analysis of labour force
participation to study the effects on children and families (see e.g. Loeb et al., 2007;
Baker et al., 2008; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011b). For the moment no such study exists
for the Netherlands. However, a number of recent studies suggest that this might be
an important element to consider in the Dutch reform. Vermeer et al. (2005) and Kruif
49Despite the substantial rise in female participation found in Baker et al. (2008) they still calculate
the net effect on government finances to be negative, in part due to substantial substitution of informal
care by formal care.
50Part of the increase in hours worked by mothers is counteracted by the drop in hours worked by
fathers.
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et al. (2009) use a large number of internationally comparable indicators for the quality
of daycare, and find a disturbing trend.51 On a scale from 1 (bad) to 7 (excellent), their
sample scored on average 4.8 in 1995, 4.3 in 2001, 3.2 in 2005 and a meager 2.8 in 2008.
Furthermore, in 2008, 49% of daycare centres got a rating ‘insufficient’ and 51% got a
rating of ‘poor’, while none of the 200 daycare centres got a rating of ‘good’. Hence, it
seems important to study how the policy reform affected children and families, and how
participation in formal childcare affects children and families in general.
We are also interested in how these effects may differ in the short- and long-run. In
particular, we have used data up to 2009. Since the major changes in the parental fee
took place in 2006 and 2007, we consider our results medium-run effects. It would be
interesting to study what happened after 2009. Faced with the dramatic rise in public
expenditures on formal childcare, the current government has substantially decreased
subsidies for formal childcare. Indeed, by 2015 the average parental fee will rise to 34%
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2011). However, this will provide us with
an interesting new natural experiment, to study e.g. whether the response of parents is
symmetric for decreases and increases in the parental fee.
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Estimates result from regressions identical to column (2) in Table 3, with the treatment effect interacted with the age of
the youngest child. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients.
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Child 0–3 –0.090∗∗∗ –0.090∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Child 4–7 –0.069∗∗∗ –0.069∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Child 8–11 –0.027∗∗∗ –0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
1 child under 18 0.140∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
2 children under 18 0.093∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Lower educated –0.179∗∗∗ –0.179∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)






Age 20–25 0.107∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Age 25–30 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
Age 30–35 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Age 35–40 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Age 40–45 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 263,229 263,229
P-value test equal treatment effects 0.573 0.233
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level,
** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Year fixed effects are included but not
reported.
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Table A.2: Effect on participation rate: subgroups of women with
placebo treatment (WLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single Women Youngest Youngest Youngest
women in couples child 0–3 child 4–7 child 8–11
Placebo 00–02 0.010 –0.001 –0.013 0.017* 0.005
(0.023) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Placebo 03–04 –0.050∗ –0.004 –0.021∗∗ –0.001 –0.001
(0.024) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Treat 05–07 0.021 0.010 0.010 0.020∗∗ 0.015
(0.021) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Treat 08–09 0.038∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 26,453 236,776 155,163 119,429 110,887
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and ***
at 1% level. Individual characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included but
not reported.
Table A.3: Effect on hours worked per week: subgroups of women with
placebo treatment (WLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single Women Youngest Youngest Youngest
women in couples child 0–3 child 4–7 child 8–11
Placebo 00–02 0.798 –0.566∗∗ –0.905∗∗∗ 0.008 0.019
(0.861) (0.273) (0.284) (0.317) (0.342)
Placebo 03–04 –1.537∗ –0.219 –0.721∗∗ –0.203 –0.062
(0.887) (0.281) (0.295) (0.330) (0.351)
Treat 05–07 0.966 0.289 0.486∗ 0.423 0.300
(0.802) (0.256) (0.270) (0.298) (0.318)
Treat 08–09 1.555∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 0.399
(0.790) (0.253) (0.268) (0.296) (0.315)
Observations 23,945 207,152 135,545 105,170 98,004
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and ***
at 1% level. Individual characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included but
not reported.
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Table A.4: Regression of covariates on treatment dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Lower Higher Immigrant Single Aged Aged
variable educated educated 20–25 25–30
Treat 05–07 0.002 0.033∗∗∗ 0.006 –0.007 –0.001 –0.02∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Treat 08–09 0.011 0.058∗∗∗ 0.001 –0.028∗∗∗ –0.003∗∗∗ –0.02∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dependent Aged Aged Aged One Two
variable 30–35 35–40 40–45 child children
Treat 05–07 –0.04∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ –0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Treat 08–09 –0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.001 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Group fixed
effects and year fixed effects are included but not reported.
Table A.5: Alternative standard errors and weighting: participation women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted Y Y Y N N N
Std errors Robust Clustered Clustered Robust Clustered Clustered
group-yeara groupb group-yeara groupb
Treat 05–07 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Treat 08–09 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229
Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Individual
characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included but not reported. aStandard errors clustered
on the group-year level (64 clusters: 4 groups (youngest child 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12-17) and 16 years). bStandard errors
clustered on the group level (4 clusters (youngest child 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12-17)).
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Table A.6: Alternative standard errors and weighting: hours worked women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted Y Y Y N N N
Std errors Robust Clustered Clustered Robust Clustered Clustered
group-yeara groupb group-yeara groupb
Treat 05–07 0.661∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.661∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.424∗
(0.198) (0.174) (0.209) (0.174) (0.144) (0.148)
Treat 08–09 1.075∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗
(0.194) (0.204) (0.261) (0.145) (0.176) (0.234)
Observations 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229 263,229
Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Individual
characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included but not reported. aStandard errors clustered
on the group-year level (64 clusters: 4 groups (youngest child 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12-17) and 16 years). bStandard errors
clustered on the group level (4 clusters (youngest child 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12-17)).
Table A.7: Alternative placebo specifica-
tions: all women (WLS)
(1) (2)
Participation Hours worked
Placebo 95–99 0.011 0.150
(0.008) (0.265)
Placebo 00–02 0.010 –0.087
(0.009) (0.260)
Treat 05–07 0.023∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.243)
Treat 08–09 0.032∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.239)
Observations 263,229 231,097
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes signifi-
cant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. In-
dividual characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed
effects are included but not reported.
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Treat 05–07 0.005 0.013 0.007
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005)
Treat 08–09 0.003 –0.012∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 224,674 191,846 224,674
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10%
level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Individual characteristics,
group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included but not reported.
aThe control group consists of parents with a youngest child aged 16–17,
so we exclude individuals in the control group that were previously in
the treatment group.
Table A.9: Effect on participation rate: subgroups of men (WLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single Men Youngest Youngest Youngest
Men in couples child 0–3 child 4–7 child 8–11
Treat 05–07 –0.030 0.008∗ 0.003 0.003 0.011∗
(0.043) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Treat 08–09 –0.008 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.038) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 3,247 221,427 133,423 95,605 85,900
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level
and *** at 1% level. Individual characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are
included but not reported.
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Treat 05–07 –0.108 0.084 0.024
(0.238) (0.482) (0.281)
Treat 08–09 –0.344 –0.474 –0.211
(0.216) (0.363) (0.262)
Observations 195,879 167,350 195,879
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at
10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Individual char-
acteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are included
but not reported. aThe control group consists of parents with a
youngest child aged 16–17, so we exclude individuals in the control
group that were previously in the treatment group.
Table A.11: Effect on hours worked per week: subgroups of men
(WLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single Men Youngest Youngest Youngest
Men in couples child 0–3 child 4–7 child 8–11
Treat 05–07 0.312 –0.060 –0.341 0.006 0.278
(1.930) (0.239) (0.260) (0.286) (0.301)
Treat 08–09 –0.056 –0.345 –0.514∗∗ –0.231 –0.111
(1.774) (0.215) (0.237) (0.263) (0.279)
Observations 2,973 192,906 115,693 83,370 75,048
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level
and *** at 1% level. Individual characteristics, group fixed effects and year fixed effects are
included but not reported.
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